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INTRODUCTION
In seemingly every area of one’s daily economic interactions, con-
sumers are protected by comprehensive legal frameworks—the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ensures safe food and drugs
are available in grocery stores, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) ensures cars have safe designs, the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) ensures safe airline travel, and
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) safe-
guards workplace conditions.1 However, when consumers down-
load an app, make an online purchase, or sign-up for a new digital
service, it becomes difficult to point to a single comprehensive legal
framework that protects consumer privacy in the United States.
That is the focus of this article. American privacy law desperately
needs wholesale reform to serve the needs of the twenty-first cen-
tury consumer.
Part I of this article discusses the nature of the present consumer
privacy crisis in American industry, examining recent data
breaches, the privacy void consumers face, and the current lack of
sufficient regulatory enforcement mechanisms.2 Part II briefly ex-
plores the 2008 financial collapse, the origins of which contain nu-
merous parallels to the present privacy crisis.3 It primarily dis-
cusses the reform efforts following the financial crisis—namely the
Dodd-Frank Act. Part III analogizes the 2008 financial crisis to the
2020 privacy crisis, highlighting the “Wild West” regulatory envi-
ronment leading to each crisis, the development of economic bub-
bles, and tenuous corporate practices.4 Finally, Part IV proposes a
Dodd-Frank approach to comprehensive American consumer pri-
vacy legislation to respond to the current privacy crisis—articulat-
ing a “Data Fiduciary Rule,” the creation of a Consumer Data Pro-
tection Bureau, and the promulgation of a Volcker rule for corporate
data practices.5
1. WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN
OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 89 (2018).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part IV.
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I. BACKGROUND: PRIVATE INDUSTRY’S PRIVACY CRISIS
In an interview with ABC News, Apple CEO Tim Cook stated
that privacy in itself “has become a crisis.”6 The American public
broadly shares Cook’s sentiment. According to a March 2019 Axios
poll, fifty-eight percent of American consumers believe the threat to
online privacy is a crisis.7 In the interview, Cook discussed the ex-
pansive amount of personal information available online, noting
that “[t]he people who track on the internet know a lot more about
you than if somebody’s looking in your window . . . .”8 Though pri-
vacy is a crisis, Cook believes it is a crisis that can be addressed—
suggesting it is a problem solvable by united action.9
In 2013, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) estimated that in developed nations, an average
family of four had ten internet-connected devices in their home.10
It is not hard to imagine, in the near future, devices that will pro-
duce data concerning one’s diet, if they are home, and even whether
they are having intimate relations.11 This prospect becomes all the
more disturbing when it is likely that these devices will be sharing
information with corporate third-party entities. The number of in-
ternet-enabled devices—not just tablets and phones, but also things
like smart refrigerators—has grown from 12.5 billion to 26.7 billion
over the past decade.12 Ben Zhao, a professor of computer science
at the University of Chicago who studies security, privacy, and ar-
tificial intelligence,13 notes that the firms manufacturing smart de-
vices are often so small that “‘there is no hope of ensuring that
they’re responsive’ to privacy concerns . . . .”14 There is no pressure
for such firms to protect privacy as they have no public reputation,
like industry giants such as Facebook.15 More firms are now col-
lecting, and possibly losing or abusing, individuals’ data than ever
6. Lisa Eadicicco, Apple CEO Tim Cook Says Digital Privacy ‘Has Become a Crisis,’ BUS.
INSIDER (May 4, 2019, 6:03 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/apple-ceo-tim-cook-pri-
vacy-crisis-2019-5.
7. Kim Hart, A Growing Majority Now Views Our Online Privacy as a Crisis, AXIOS
(Mar. 9, 2019), https://www.axios.com/a-growing-majority-now-views-our-online-privacy-as-
a-crisis-1552080369-94146f05-332d-465d-a136-4414f9cdf9ce.html4.
8. Eadicicco, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. HARTZOG, supra note 1, at 261.
11. Id. at 263–64.
12. Susie Allen, The New Panopticon: Worried About Online Privacy? Computer Science




332 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 59
before.16 As an example of how ubiquitous the issue of data mining
has become:
[i]magine a seemingly innocuous retail app asking for permis-
sion to access your phone’s built-in microphone. Without
thinking much about it, you hit “allow.” The simple tap of a
button allows the app to listen for inaudible, high-pitched bea-
cons emitted from its partner websites in addition to advertise-
ments and storefronts. That means the company can know
where you’ve been and what ads you’ve seen, online and of-
fline.17
In short, “the company that makes your toaster knows you’re a
lefty who drives a Honda.”18 The fact that a growing number of the
objects surrounding us are becoming internet-connected is a “prom-
inent concern” for privacy.19 More internet devices create a greater
potential for data leaks, surveillance, and security vulnerabilities.20
Many regard privacy as a human right.21 In many countries, the
right to privacy is not explicitly protected, particularly on the inter-
net.22 Over the last three decades, there has been an aggressive
erosion of privacy.23 Most things on the internet appear to be
“free.”24 But, they are not free. The public pays for them in other
ways—via data and attention.25 This is the price paid to Facebook
for social networking and to Google for searches.26 As individuals
move throughout the world around them, they leave a trail of data
behind them.27 This electronic footprint left on the internet “tells a
story.”28 The data generated by network-connected smart devices
“is almost invariably sent to the cloud where it’s carefully aggre-
gated, packaged, and then usually sold.”29 The privacy and atten-




19. HARTZOG, supra note 1, at 261.
20. Id.
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growing increasingly personal.30 Now the data being shared, col-
lected, and sold is not just “email[s] or the photographs of your cat,
but your location, your heart rate, your respiration rate . . . [n]ot
just how you slept last night, but with whom.”31 In short, connect-
ing devices to the internet has resulted in poor privacy controls and
poor security.32 Consumers can avoid the death of privacy only if
problems with smart devices continue to be “public relations night-
mares for the companies involved.”33 “The loss of privacy may seem
inevitable, but the only thing that makes it that way is our own
apathy.”34
Thus, “[t]here is no longer any question that data collection can
create privacy harms for individuals: the question is what the law
can and should do about it.”35 Currently, the central goal of Amer-
ican privacy law “is to create an environment where industry exper-
iments first and asks questions later . . . .”36 “Data collection by
private entities is governed by a patchwork of state and federal law
that applies on a sectoral basis.”37 If no sector-specific law applies,
companies are free to collect data and use it at-will.38
But, if there is a privacy crisis, this raises the question of how
exactly we define privacy. One way of defining privacy is “limited
access to the self.”39 As it relates to privacy concerns in industry—
primarily the overzealous collection, subsequent sale, and illicit use
of personal information—this definition of privacy shall suffice for
purposes of this article. After all, preventing exposure of one’s per-
sonal information limits access to one’s most intimate self. As an
elaboration, privacy scholar Alan Westin defines privacy as “the
claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for them-
selves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others.”40 The current landscape of privacy law in
America, as well as globally, represents a “work in progress” held






35. Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Infor-
mation Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1059 (2019).
36. Id. This is oddly reminiscent of KGB operatives during the Cold War, who shot first
and asked questions later.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. HARTZOG, supra note 1, at 10.
40. Id. at 63.
41. Id. at 56.
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America’s current “patchwork approach to privacy” allows some
problems to go unnoticed and unsolved.42 Exacerbating this issue,
“lawmakers focus so intently on the details of complex, sector-spe-
cific statutes and regulations that they often fail to see the forest
for the trees.”43 In short, America’s legislators are not using all of
their available tools to confront the privacy crisis.44 Current disclo-
sure-based regulatory regimes tend to “bury and obscure privacy-
relevant information,” overwhelming users.45 One need only look
at a single app’s privacy policy to understand this. Consumers are
most often confronted by:
a threadbare, formalistic, or meaningless technical legal com-
pliance . . . that overwhelms individuals with information and
choices instead of substantively protecting them. It would be
impracticable to read even a small fraction of the privacy no-
tices we’re asked to consent to or to forgo using the services we
rely on . . . .46
If ordinary internet users were to read every single privacy policy
they came across in the span of a year, it would take the user sev-
enty-six working days to do so.47 “[M]obile apps can seek over 235
. . . different types of permissions from smartphone users, with the
average app asking for around five different permissions to access
and use data.”48 Efforts to adapt the privacy torts to modern data
collection and uses have failed.49
There is an inherent hypocrisy to the modern privacy crisis.
“[W]hile powerful businesses, financial institutions, and govern-
ment agencies hide their actions behind nondisclosure agreements
. . . our own lives are increasingly open books. Everything we do
online is recorded . . . .”50 The decline in personal privacy has not
been matched by business transparency. Credit agencies, search
engines, and banks collect data about individuals, quantifying it
into scores, rankings, and risk calculations while simultaneously
shielding the details of the mechanisms by which they do so from
42. Id. at 57. For example, reliance on a web of statutes prevents privacy issues relating
to overall technological design from being uniformly regulated.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 59.
46. Id. at 61.
47. Id. at 64.
48. Id. at 66.
49. Id. at 67.
50. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROLMONEY AND INFORMATION 3 (2015).
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public scrutiny.51 Corporations “have unprecedented knowledge of
the minutiae of our daily lives, while we know little to nothing about
how they use this knowledge . . . .”52
As the internet has become ubiquitous, “personal data became
substantially easier to access and track in ways unimaginable in
decades prior.”53 Moreover, advanced algorithms allow utilization
of personal data in a variety of fashions, “from predicting social
trends to providing personalized financial advice.”54 Processing of
personal data can yield social benefits while misuse of personal data
can inflict personal harm upon individuals.55
A. Recent Data Breaches & the Privacy Void
Recent consumer data breaches provide a helpful illustration of
the privacy crisis described above.
1. The Equifax Data Breach
In September 2017, Equifax, one of the three largest consumer
credit reporting agencies in the United States, announced that its
systems had been compromised.56 The data breach included
“names, home addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, social se-
curity numbers, and driver’s license numbers. The credit card num-
bers of approximately 209,000 consumers were also breached.”57
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairman Joe Simons asserted
that Equifax “failed to take basic steps that may have prevented
the breach that affected approximately 147 million consumers.”58
The FTC claimed “Equifax failed to patch its network after being
alerted in March 2017 to a critical security vulnerability . . . .”59
Hackers were able to access a staggering amount of data because
Equifax failed to implement basic security concerns.60 The FTC also
claimed Equifax stored network credentials and passwords, as well
51. Id. at 4.
52. Id. at 9.
53. Tyler Stites, Data Protection on the Doorstep: How the GDPR Impacts American Fi-
nancial Institutions, 38 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 132, 132 (2018).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Equifax Data Breach, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/data-
breach/equifax/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2019).
57. Id.
58. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Equifax to Pay $575Million as Part of Settlement
with FTC, CFPB, and States Related to 2017 Data Breach (July 22, 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/equifax-pay-575-million-part-settle-
ment-ftc-cfpb-states-related [hereinafter FTC Press Release].
59. Id.
60. Id.
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as Social Security numbers and other sensitive consumer infor-
mation, in plain text.61 Ironically, “[d]espite its failure to imple-
ment basic security measures, Equifax’s privacy policy at the time
stated that it limited access to consumers’ personal information and
implemented ‘reasonable physical, technical, and procedural safe-
guards’ to protect consumer data.”62 Unfortunately, Equifax’s re-
sponse to the data breach was not entirely successful. Its response
to the breach “raised concerns among security experts and con-
sumer advocates,” with security expert Brian Krebs labeling
Equifax’s response to the breach as a “dumpster fire.”63 Moreover,
consumers who contacted Equifax following the breach to freeze
their credit were given PINs that corresponded to the date and time
of the freeze, making the PINs easier for criminals to guess.64
Both the FTC and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) investigated the Equifax Data Breach.65 As a result of the
data breach, Equifax agreed to pay at least $575 million, and po-
tentially up to $700 million, as part of a global settlement with the
FTC, CFPB, and fifty states and territories.66 After a settlement
with Equifax, affected consumers could file a claim for free credit
monitoring or accept a cash payment of $125.67 Moreover, “begin-
ning in January 2020, Equifax will provide all U.S. consumers with
six free credit reports each year for seven years . . . .”68 But, credit
monitoring or a few dollars cannot truly compensate the loss of one’s
privacy, particularly with respect to sensitive information like so-
cial security numbers. However, Equifax even botched the manage-
ment of its settlement. The public response to the settlement has
been overwhelming.69 Because the amount of money set aside for
the cash payment option is capped at $31 million, consumers who
select that option may not receive the $125 they expected.70
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Equifax Data Breach, supra note 56.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See FTC Press Release, supra note 58.
67. Equifax Data Breach, supra note 56.
68. FTC Press Release, supra note 58.
69. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Encourages Consumers to Opt for Free
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2. The Capital One Data Breach
In July 2019, a Seattle software engineer hacked into a server
holding Capital One’s customer information, obtaining the personal
data of over 100 million people.71 The culprit stole 140,000 Social
Security numbers and 80,000 bank account numbers in the breach,
later boasting online a desire to “distribute” the information.72 Cap-
ital One has suffered prior security breaches. In 2017, the same
year as the Equifax breach, Capital One reported that a former em-
ployee had access to consumers’ personal data for nearly four
months, including account numbers, telephone numbers, transac-
tion history, and Social Security numbers.73 Security breaches are
a continuous threat to the financial industry. JPMorgan Chase ex-
ecutive Jamie Dimon has stated that his company spends nearly
$600 million per year on security.74 Similarly, Bank of America has
said that its budget for cybersecurity is a blank check.75
3. Other Significant Data Breaches
Organizations like Anthem, Blue Cross Blue Shield, T-Mobile,
the Internal Revenue Service, and the United States Army National
Guard have all experienced data breaches in recent years.76 Yet,
the privacy void we face is not the result of corporate “evil” or ma-
lintent. In fact, many business executives expressly state their con-
cerns for the privacy of their consumers and user base;77 rather,
such issues are the result of “overwhelming” economic initiatives to
“design technologies in a way that maximizes the collection, use,
and disclosure of personal information.”78 Opponents of additional
privacy regulations on industry claim that “[w]e already have effec-
tive privacy laws that prevent harmful collection, use, and disclo-
sure of personal information . . . .”79 However, “[a] study by the Pew
Research Center found that most adults do not believe online ser-
vice providers will keep their data private and secure.”80
71. Emily Flitter & Karen Weise, Capital One Data Breach Compromises Data of over






76. HARTZOG, supra note 1, at 3.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id. at 5.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 6.
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There have been numerous data breaches in recent years. For
example, a 2013 breach of Yahoo resulted in the theft of names,
birth dates, phone numbers, and passwords impacting nearly three
billion users of the site worldwide.81 A 2015 breach of the federal
government’s Office of Personnel Management resulted in exposure
of the personal data of more than twenty million people, including
many with government security clearances.82 Data breaches of
Chipotle, Home Depot, and Target impacted over 100 million indi-
viduals, whose credit card numbers were stolen.83
Data breaches create considerable problems for consumers stem-
ming from the loss of privacy. One such problem is identity theft.84
The FTC reported 399,225 cases of identity theft in the United
States in 2016.85 Of that number, twenty-nine percent involved the
use of personal data to commit tax fraud.86 More than thirty-two
percent reported that their data was used to commit credit card
fraud.87 Additionally, a 2015 report from the Department of Justice
estimated the cost of identity theft to the American economy at
$15.4 billion.88 For an individual consumer, identity theft can re-
sult in denial of credit for credit cards and loans, denial of housing,
increased interest rates on existing credit cards, and emotional dis-
tress and anxiety.89
Privacy is being eroded “click by click.”90 Those concerned with
privacy most often ask how they can protect themselves in the age
of data collection and data breach.91 But, this begs the question:
why must individuals protect themselves in the realm of privacy
when the law shields the public for protective purposes in other fac-
ets of life, such as operating a motor vehicle, financial services, and
criminal justice? This article argues that individuals should not
have to.
B. The Lack of Federal Trade Commission Enforcement Power
Given the current state of privacy law in the United States, a pri-
vate actor not falling under the definition of a narrowly defined,









90. HARTZOG, supra note 1, at 6.
91. Allen, supra note 12, at 12.
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sector-specific privacy statute “can largely do whatever it wants
with the data it collects or otherwise obtains, provided it does not
lie about its actions and attract the attention of an overstretched
FTC.”92 Presently, the FTC is the primary federal agency tasked
with protecting individuals from privacy exploitation from commer-
cial entities as it pertains to data privacy, data security, and data
misuse.93
The FTC asserts that “[w]hen companies tell consumers they will
safeguard their personal information,” it takes legal action to en-
sure companies fulfill their promises.94 One of the only major fed-
eral legal frameworks in the United States addressing privacy in
the consumer realm is Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.95 In many instances of consumer privacy issues, the FTC
charges corporations with violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.96
Specifically, Section 5(a) of the FTC Act declares unlawful “[u]nfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce . . . .”97
However, there are substantial limits to the FTC’s ability to pro-
tect consumer privacy. Any company within the FTC’s jurisdiction
that uses consumer information in a way that constitutes an unfair
or deceptive trade practice is subject to the FTC’s oversight.98 The
FTC is essentially the “sole backstop for the weaknesses of the rest
of U.S. consumer privacy law . . . .”99 In short, the FTC can only do
so much. Moreover, the FTC’s authority does not include common
carriers or non-profits.100 The FTC also lacks the general rulemak-
ing authority of other administrative agencies, policing industry
only on a reactive, case-by-case basis.101 In privacy and data secu-
rity cases, the FTC typically only utilizes its “deception” authority
and rarely relies on its “unfairness” authority.102 This means that
the FTC’s monitoring of privacy abuses remains limited to those in-
stances when a company is not forthright about its practices, “re-
gardless of whether the practice itself is inherently abusive . . . .”103
Because most privacy policies are “difficult to understand” and
92. Barrett, supra note 35, at 1061–62.
93. Id. at 1073.
94. Privacy and Security Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/privacy-security-enforcement (last vis-
ited Sept. 22, 2019).
95. See generally 15 U.S.C.A. § 45.
96. Privacy and Security Enforcement, supra note 94.
97. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1).
98. Barrett, supra note 35, at 1073–74.
99. Id. at 1074.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1075.
103. Id.
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“rarely read,” the FTC’s reliance on deception-based enforcement is
relatively narrow, allowing corporations to escape legal scrutiny so
long as their privacy policies remain truthful, even if exploitative.104
The FTC’s regulatory approach follows no more than an insufficient
“do not lie” approach to privacy.105
As data breaches become more pervasive and devastating, the
FTC is becoming increasingly reluctant to comment on even egre-
gious cases of consumer privacy infractions.106 The FTC lacks the
economic teeth necessary to realistically punish corporations for
privacy transgressions. The FTC’s powers do not have a “serious
deterrent effect” for preventing mishandling of our private infor-
mation.107 The largest privacy fine the FTC ever imposed is $5 bil-
lion.108 For comparison, Facebook’s 2018 revenue alone was approx-
imately $56 billion, “making the likelihood of a fine that will mean-
ingfully change the company’s approach decidedly slim.”109 Overall,
the FTC’s privacy enforcement mechanisms are “deliberately lais-
sez-faire.”110 This is a fundamental shortcoming because “protect-
ing consumers in a twenty-first century economy where ubiquitous
commercial surveillance can both harm consumers and have anti-
competitive effects requires an FTC that can prevent new kinds of
informational harms, not simply react to them.”111 As it stands, the
nation’s largest companies lack a sufficient check on abusive, pri-
vacy-invasive practices.112 In fact, “[t]here is little in current law to
prevent companies from selling their profiles of you.”113
II. THE ADOPTION OF THEDODD-FRANK ACT
The 2008 economic collapse, known as the Great Recession,114
would be among the worst in American history, rivaling only the
104. Id.
105. HARTZOG, supra note 1, at 67–68.
106. Barrett, supra note 35, at 1075–76; see, e.g., Taylor Telford & Craig Timberg, Mar-
riott Discloses Massive Data Breach Affecting up to 500 Million Guests, WASH. POST (Nov. 30,
2018, 1:03 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/30/marriott-discloses-
massive-data-breach-impacting-million-guests/.
107. PASQUALE, supra note 50, at 23.
108. Lesley Fair, FTC’s $5 Billion Facebook Settlement: Record-Breaking and History-
Making, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 24, 2019, 8:52 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/blogs/business-blog/2019/07/ftcs-5-billion-facebook-settlement-record-breaking-his-
tory.
109. Barrett, supra note 35, at 1076–77.
110. Id. at 1077.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. Id.
113. PASQUALE, supra note 50, at 32.
114. For a comprehensive overview of the causes and consequences of the 2008 financial
crisis, see FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL
Summer 2021 Too Big to Protect 341
Great Depression. The Great Recession led to economic despair
that was unprecedented in twenty-first century America. Economic
growth declined for three straight quarters in late 2008 and early
2009, by 1.3%, 5.4%, and 6.4% respectively.115 Unemployment rose
to over ten percent in the United States.116
The Great Recession led to the adoption of several regulatory re-
gimes that changed the landscape of how government entities ap-
proached economic regulation in the financial sector. Following the
collapse, the government’s regulatory focus shifted from monitoring
the economic soundness of “individual” financial institutions to the
health of the financial “system.”117 Onemajor reform was the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(Dodd-Frank).118 Dodd-Frank “is the most comprehensive financial
reform legislation since the Great Depression.”119 Its key provisions
include consumer protection provisions, resolution authority for
oversight entities, systemic risk regulation, the Volcker Rule, and
regulation of derivatives.120
A. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
One of the major provisions of Dodd-Frank was the creation of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), a “completely
independent”121 agency tasked with examining and enforcing regu-
lations on all businesses with more than $10 billion in assets en-
gaged in issuing residential mortgage products as well as on issuers
of financial products targeted at low-income Americans.122 “For
consumer financial services, the centerpiece of the Dodd-Frank Act
was the creation of the [CFPB].”123 Congress vested the CFPB with
the consumer financial protection functions of numerous federal
agencies and gave the CFPB broad authority over segments of the
consumer financial services market not previously subject to federal
MARKETS 274–86 (4th ed. 2015). The modern privacy landscape suffers from similar techno-
logical and information-based issues that led to the collapse. See generally PASQUALE, supra
note 50, at 4–5. However, the focus of this article is how parallel reform efforts can address
these parallel issues.
115. MISHKIN, supra note 114, at 282.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 283–84.
118. Id. at 284; see also 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 5301–5641.
119. MISHKIN, supra note 114, at 284.
120. Id. at 284–85.
121. Id. at 284.
122. Id.
123. Donald C. Lampe & Ryan J. Richardson, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
at Five: A Survey of the Bureau’s Activities, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 85, 85 (2017).
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regulation.124 The CFPB serves three primary functions: rulemak-
ing, supervision, and enforcement.125
Like the Consumer Data Protection Bureau called for later in this
article,126 the CFPB’s origins lie in legal academia, as “calls to con-
solidate federal consumer financial protection functions in a single
federal agency predated the financial crisis.”127 In 2005, Professor
Heidi Mandanis Schooner of Catholic University argued that bank-
ing regulatory agencies’ consumer protection responsibilities
should be assigned to a single consumer protection agency.128 In
2007, then-Professor Elizabeth Warren of Harvard University ar-
gued in an article entitled “Unsafe at Any Rate” that “streamlined
federal consumer protections in the market for tangible goods (like
toasters) had successfully balanced the twin goals of protecting con-
sumers and promoting innovation.”129 In contrast, a fragmented
regulatory framework in the financial services market had done the
exact opposite, failing to protect consumers and limiting innova-
tion.130 Warren suggested the creation of a Financial Product
Safety Commission to create guidelines for consumer disclosure,
collect data regarding the uses of financial products, review finan-
cial products for consumer safety, and require modification of cer-
tain dangerous products before they could be marketed to the pub-
lic.131
Dodd-Frank provides the CFPB with broad rulemaking, supervi-
sory, and enforcement power over the consumer financial services
market.132 Congress gives the CFPB authority over “covered per-
sons,” which includes “‘any person that engages in offering or
providing a consumer financial product or service’ and ‘any affiliate
of [such a person if the] affiliate acts as a service provider to the
covered person.’”133 Under Dodd-Frank, the CFPB can require re-
ports and examinations of “covered persons” and “service providers”
to assess their compliance with the law by obtaining information
about their activities and compliance systems while detecting risks
124. Id.
125. Id. at 86.
126. See infra Part IV.B.
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to consumers and markets in the realm of consumer financial prod-
ucts and services.134
The CFPB also has the power to “enforce” federal consumer fi-
nancial law, including Title X of Dodd-Frank and rules created un-
der Title X.135 Dodd-Frank provides the CFPB with three primary
enforcement tools: (1) investigation of potential violations of federal
consumer financial law; (2) the ability to bring public legal actions
in federal court or an administrative forum for violations of federal
consumer financial law; and (3) the ability to seek injunctive and
monetary relief for violations of federal consumer financial law.136
The CFPB may demand document production, written responses,
and oral testimony if it “has reason to believe that any person may
be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material
or tangible things, or may have any information” relevant to a vio-
lation of consumer financial law.137 While the CFPB’s rulemaking
and supervisory authorities only apply to “covered persons,” its
broad enforcement authority applies to any “person,” resulting in a
“sweeping, plenary power.”138
The CFPB is flexible in its approach, adapting to necessary con-
sumer protection issues as they arise via market developments.
But, as much as the CFPB has earned praise from “members of Con-
gress, consumer and community advocates and others,” it has also
“attracted the attention of policymakers intent on modifying the
agency’s structure and slimming down its powers,” such as the
Trump Administration.139 The impact of the CFPB has been signif-
icant in its short history. It has “facilitated approximately $11.7
billion in consumer redress and $440 million in penalties . . . while
promulgating thousands of pages of complex, wide-ranging regula-
tions mandated or contemplated by the Dodd-Frank Act,” while also
conducting over 100 examinations.140
B. The Fiduciary Rule
One of Dodd-Frank’s major reforms included the “Fiduciary
Rule.”141 “The Fiduciary Rule requires financial advisers to act in
the best interests of their clients regarding retirement planning
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. . . .”142 The Fiduciary Rule was a package of seven different rules
that re-interpreted the term “investment advice fiduciary” to en-
compass a wider variety of financial transactions.143
Beginning in 2010, the Department of Labor set out to overhaul
the investment advice fiduciary definition.144 Monumentally im-
portant to the financial services sector, the Fiduciary Rule consisted
of 275 pages of regulations.145 The Fiduciary Rule’s definition of
“investment advice fiduciary” encompassed “virtually all financial
and insurance professionals who do business with ERISA plans and
IRA holders.”146 The Fiduciary Rule also included a Best Interest
Contract Exemption (BICE), allowing certain financial services pro-
viders to be exempt from the penalty provisions of the rule.147 To
qualify for an exemption, financial services providers would need to
enter into contracts with clients that affirm their fiduciary status,
incorporate impartial conduct standards including the duties of loy-
alty and prudence, avoiding misleading statements, and that
“charge no more than ‘reasonable compensation.’”148
However, despite its novelty, the reign of the fiduciary rule was
short-lived, as its politically charged149 nature led to its challenge
in federal court by business groups.150 In 2018, the Fifth Circuit
vacated the rule,151 “effectively put[ting] an end” to its operation.152
Consumer advocates labeled the Fifth Circuit decision as “tragic,”
noting its implication that consumers would be “on their own” in
looking out for their financial interests.153 However, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), whom Dodd-Frank specifically
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authorized to create its fiduciary standard, has plans of proposing
its own fiduciary standard.154
C. The Volcker Rule
One of Dodd-Frank’s key risk management provisions is known
as the Volcker Rule.155 The Volcker Rule consists of a regulatory
provision that limits the extent to which banks can trade with de-
positors’ money.156 This rule also prevents banks from owning more
than just a small percentage of shadow entities such as hedge funds
and private equity funds.157 The rule prevents banks from under-
taking large trading risks when they benefit from the safety net of
federal deposit insurance.158 As an analogy, the Volcker Rule of
Dodd-Frank seeks to limit the moral hazard problem similar to that
of a gambler using someone else’s money: “I do not care if I lose
$20,000 when my friend’s money essentially insures me for
$40,000.” Thus, the Volcker Rule handcuffs banks from “gambling”
their depositors’ money.
III. ANALOGIZING THE CRISES: TOO BIG TO FAIL VS. TOO BIG TO
PROTECT
In many ways, the modern privacy crisis resembles the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis. In the sections below, these parallels are explored:
the “WildWest” regulatory environment present in both realms, the
data collection bubble currently arising in twenty-first century life
(similar to the housing market bubble), and problems arising from
the corporate use and sale of consumer data (similar to the frequent
re-sale of mortgages by financial institutions prior to the financial
crisis).
A. The “Wild West” Regulatory Environment
Specifically, the regulatory environment for American consumer
privacy in 2019 largely parallels the pre-2008 Wall Street regula-
tory environment in terms of the weakness of the industry protec-
tions present in the current law. In the United States, “no compre-
hensive federal privacy or cybersecurity legislation has been
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346 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 59
enacted . . . .”159 In recent years, there has been a “dramatic in-
crease in devastating cyberattacks” and an increase in the “sophis-
tication of hackers.”160 Even to businesses, “[c]yberattacks can be
incredibly costly . . . as the company’s data may be temporarily un-
available, destroyed, or even stolen or misused.”161 The 2019 con-
sumer privacy landscape also resembles the Wild West, as “lax en-
forcement makes perfect sense in an environment where platforms
want as many users as possible, as many app purchases as possible,
and as many ad clicks as possible.”162 American privacy law “needs
a radical course correction, not a mere adjustment.”163
Corporations are not being entirely forthcoming with how they
handle privacy. In 2014, Snapchat “ran afoul of the FTC for lying
about how ephemeral its communications were.”164 The current
concepts of notice and disclosure are also flawed. “[P]rivacy law still
prioritizes technical compliance over meaningful disclosure when
demanding notice.”165 Mortgage disclosures prior to 2008, as dis-
cussed above were similarly opaque. Woodrow Hartzog, a privacy
scholar at Northeastern University School of Law, cautions, how-
ever, that “[p]rivate causes of action for privacy violations should be
exceptions to the general rule of compliance.”166 Reform must tar-
get proactive solutions, rather than reactive panic.
In sum, “[m]ost data privacy laws within the U.S. are frag-
mented, regulating specific states or industries.”167 FTC regulatory
authority derives mostly from enforcing company-issued privacy
policies.168 Dodd-Frank allowed the CFPB to study and regulate
data portability in the United States.169 Yet, the CFPB’s current
leadership takes a largely “inactive” approach to such regulation.170
This essentially is a modified self-regulatory scheme, a potential
recipe for disaster in the privacy realm. As Johnnie Cochran fa-
mously quipped in the O.J. Simpson trial, who is going to “police
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the police?”171 “[S]elf-regulation alone is not going to cut it” in terms
of privacy protections in the twenty-first century.172 Numerous in-
centives exist for companies to “design consumer technologies in
ways that are adversarial” to our privacy interests.173
The time is ripe for reform. The business scandals of the late
nineteenth century Gilded Age sparked bold legal reforms when the
American public demanded business be held accountable to public
scrutiny.174 Such efforts intensified following the Great Depression
in the form of the New Deal.175 Numerous pieces of landmark leg-
islation were passed to peel back the unnerving shroud of secrecy
that encapsulated American industry and Wall Street.176 America
saw passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.177 Throughout the twentieth century, a push
for consumer protection led to the creation of new federal agencies,
such as the FDA and the Consumer Product Safety Commission.178
However, with the rise of the new millennium and the dawn of the
age of Google, a cloak of corporate secrecy re-arose.179 Internet tech-
nologies are spreading, “unmonitored and unregulated.”180
B. The Data Collection Bubble
Privacy issues could be exacerbated if the economy’s new “[t]ech
[b]ubble” bursts.181 Just about every company now holds user
data.182 If this data bubble bursts, what will be left of massive com-
panies like Facebook and Twitter? Likely, “the only thing worth
salvaging from the shells of former tech companies may be user
data.”183 As for what the aftermath of a collapse would look like
from a data perspective, consider the bankruptcy of RadioShack.
When RadioShack filed for bankruptcy, “one of the assets it put up
for sale was its meticulously compiled database of information on
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millions of its customers.”184 Soon thereafter, AT&T and Apple
claimed to own some of the data, and “officials in a handful of states
warned that the sale could violate state laws.”185
“Corporations, data brokers, and even criminals might buy failed
companies just for their users’ personal information.”186 Companies
may resort to selling user data—”whether it’s personally identifia-
ble information, data about preferences, habits, and hobbies, or na-
tional-security files.”187 This data could be attractive to both busi-
ness and criminal buyers.188 “If contracts and privacy policies pre-
vent a floundering company from selling user data, there’s still an-
other way to profit. Most privacy policies that promise not to sell
user data include a caveat in case of bankruptcy or sale.”189 A New
York Times analysis of 100 of the top web sites in the United States
last year found that eighty-five percent of them include clauses in
their privacy policies, providing that “[i]f the ownership or control
of all or part of our [s]ervices or their assets change[], we may trans-
fer your information to the new owner.”190 This type of transfer of
data bears resemblance to the securitization and subsequent sale of
packages of mortgage loans in 2008 by failing financial services or-
ganizations.191 If the tech bubble bursts, it is unlikely that the FTC
would have appropriate enforcement power to “keep up with the
sheer number of previously overvalued data-rich companies offer-
ing themselves . . . for sale.”192 Without any other legal remedy in
place, “the post-bubble technology industry will take your data
down with it . . . .”193
IV. THEDODD-FRANK APPROACH FOR AMERICAN PRIVACY
If Americans cannot stop “pervasive” data collection, use, and
sale, the question becomes: “[w]hat do we do?”194 Self-help through
privacy-enhancing technologies like “do not track” functions in in-
ternet browsers will likely fail “on practical grounds for all but the








191. See generally MISHKIN, supra note 114, at 274–86.
192. Waddell, supra note 181.
193. Id.
194. PASQUALE, supra note 50, at 52.
195. Id. at 53–54.
Summer 2021 Too Big to Protect 349
privacy “enhancing” technology emerges, so does privacy “eviscer-
ating” technology.196 In short, the answer lies in the law. Imposing
accountability-based legal structures on corporations that define
“fair and unfair uses of information” can catalyze a solution.197 This
article proposes a Dodd-Frank approach to comprehensive Ameri-
can consumer privacy legislation based upon three prongs: (1) fidu-
ciary responsibilities; (2) the creation of a Consumer Data Protec-
tion Bureau; and (3) the promulgation of a “Volcker Rule” for data
privacy.
A. Mandate of Data Fiduciary Responsibilities
To be effective, comprehensive consumer privacy legislation
should include a mandate of fiduciary responsibilities upon certain
data-collecting American businesses who share a special relation-
ship to consumers because of consumers’ trust in these businesses
with their most sensitive information. In short, businesses would
be subject to fiduciary responsibilities when holding themselves out
as organizations who give consumers reason to believe personal
consumer data will not face unreasonable disclosure or misuse.
Such an idea is not outlandish or even without legislative support.
Senator Brian Schatz, as well as fourteen other Senators, have al-
ready proposed the Data Care Act, a comprehensive legislative
framework that “sketches out broad duties of loyalty, care, and con-
fidentiality, while providing the FTC with rulemaking authority to
determine the details.”198
Though market forces are often powerful in curbing illicit busi-
ness behavior, here they are likely to be insufficient. A mandate is
necessary because “a voluntary [information fiduciary regulatory]
regime shaped by the lobbyists for the companies it would purport
to regulate will be subject to the same broad provisions and tepid
commitments of other self-regulatory programs that have been
largely ineffective.”199 All else being equal, “companies like Face-
book or Google would like to maximize the value of the personal
data they collect” as “end-user data is one of [a company’s] most
valuable assets.”200 But, its status as a central component of many
companies’ business models “creates an inherent potential for
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conflicts of interest” between the company and the consumer.201 Ad-
ditionally, reliance upon market forces alone to solve these conflict
of interest problems is insufficient.202 Though the market can pun-
ish companies with bad reputations for mistreating their consum-
ers, “there is no guarantee that this will be enough to effectively
police all forms of misbehavior.”203 Personal data is a source of
wealth in the digital economy.204 Because of this, information fidu-
ciaries “should be able to monetize some uses of personal data . . .
.”205 What they should not be able to do is “use the data in unex-
pected ways to the disadvantage of people who use their services or
in ways that violate some other important social norm.”206
1. The Jack Balkin “Information Fiduciaries” Concept
Privacy is not at odds with business development and innovation.
As Professor Jack Balkin of Yale Law School recognizes, “personal
privacy in the digital age can co-exist with rights to collect, analyze,
and distribute information that are protected under the First
Amendment . . . through the concept of an information fiduciary.”207
“[M]any online service providers and cloud companies who collect,
analyze, use, sell, and distribute personal information should be
seen as information fiduciaries toward their customers and end-us-
ers.”208 Modern consumer businesses rooted in digital technology
possess special power and relationships with others. Accordingly,
Balkin argues that information fiduciaries have “special duties to
act in ways that do not harm the interests of the people whose in-
formation they collect, analyze, use, sell, and distribute.”209 How-
ever, as a responsible basis for a privacy regulatory framework, the
duties information fiduciaries owe must be contextually related to
both the nature of their business and the expectations of the pub-
lic.210
This begs the question, however, of what a fiduciary is. A fiduci-
ary is “one who has special obligations of loyalty and trustworthi-
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the other person—known as the beneficiary or client.211 At its core,
a fiduciary relationship is a relationship of trust.212 A client puts
their trust or confidence in the fiduciary, and the fiduciary must
avoid betraying the client’s confidence or trust.213 Fiduciaries may
perform professional services or manage property for a client,214 but
they do not necessarily have to. Yet, almost always, fiduciaries
“also handle sensitive personal information” as fiduciary relation-
ships “involve the use and exchange of information.”215 Modern con-
sumer interactions are no different.
Generally, fiduciaries have two basic duties to their beneficiaries:
a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.216 First, the duty of care re-
quires the fiduciary to “act competently and diligently so as not to
harm the interests” of the beneficiary.217 Second, the duty of loyalty
requires the fiduciary to keep their beneficiaries’ interests at heart
and act in the beneficiaries’ interests.218 At the heart of these duties
are relationships “often centrally concerned with the collection,
analysis, use, and disclosure of information.”219 Therefore, a fiduci-
ary also has a duty “not to use information . . . in ways that harm
or undermine” the beneficiary.220 Accordingly, all fiduciaries, at
least as Balkin labels them, are “information fiduciaries.”221 An in-
formation fiduciary is “a person or business who, because of their
relationship with another, has taken on special duties with respect
to the information they obtain in the course of the relationship.”222
Moreover, people and organizations possessing fiduciary duties
arising from the use or exchange of information are fiduciaries re-
gardless of whether they do something on the beneficiary’s be-
half.223 The information fiduciary model provides a broad corner-
stone by which legislators may shape the coverage scope of twenty-
first century consumer privacy law in the United States.
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2. Data’s Fiduciary Rule
The modern digital age has “given rise to new fiduciary relation-
ships created by the explosion of the collection and use of personal
data”224 because there now exists relationships of trust between
end-users and online consumer service providers. However, from a
regulatory perspective, Balkin argues that these relationships
should not be identical to traditional professional fiduciary relation-
ships in all respects because they “may not require the same degree
of obligation, loyalty, and protection . . . .”225 But, these are still
fiduciary relationships nonetheless. Balkin notes that “in the digi-
tal age, because we trust [consumer entities] with sensitive infor-
mation,” these entities take on fiduciary responsibilities.226
Balkin argues we should adopt an information fiduciary regula-
tory model for twenty-first century consumer privacy protection for
four main reasons. First, consumers’ relationships with many busi-
ness entities now involve “significant vulnerability” because these
businesses have considerable expertise and knowledge with respect
to proprietary online services, and consumers generally lack infor-
mation about the businesses or what they do with collected infor-
mation.227 Second, consumers are “in a position of relative depend-
ence with respect to these companies.”228 Businesses provide many
different kinds of services consumers need and consumers must
hope that the companies will not misuse their information or abuse
their confidence in ways that will harm them.229 Third, many online
service providers and consumer businesses “hold themselves out as
experts in providing certain kinds of services in exchange for [con-
sumers’] personal information.”230 Fourth, these entities know they
hold valuable data that may be used to consumers’ disadvantage,
and they understand consumers are aware of this.231 Thus, these
businesses “hold themselves out as trustworthy organizations who
act consistent with our interests, even though they also hope to turn
a profit.”232 In short, “[b]ecause people understand that they are
vulnerable to the collection of personal data, and because they also
recognize that the methods used by online service providers are be-
yond their understanding, they seek reassurance that using these
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services is safe.”233 Unfortunately, most of the details of how com-
panies are utilizing consumers’ sensitive information is buried
within the “fine print of their privacy policies and in the code of the
company’s information infrastructure.”234 Therefore, “a changing
society generates new kinds of fiduciary relations and fiduciary ob-
ligations that the law can and should recognize.”235 Balkin suggests
the following formulation for a Data Fiduciary Rule:
People and business entities act as information fiduciaries (1)
when these people or entities hold themselves out to the public
as privacy-respecting organizations in order to gain the trust
of those who use them; (2) when these people or entities give
individuals reason to believe that they will not disclose or mis-
use their personal information; and (3) when the affected indi-
viduals reasonably believe that these people or entities will not
disclose or misuse their personal information based on existing
social norms of reasonable behavior, existing patterns of prac-
tice, or other objective factors that reasonably justify their
trust.236
Importantly, Balkin notes this formulation of a Data Fiduciary
Rule “may require information fiduciaries to protect more things
than they have explicitly set out in their privacy policies.”237
Though, this is for the better. As the late Justice Antonin Scalia
often noted, “[t]he more speech, the better.”238 Likewise, the more
privacy the better. A Data Fiduciary Rule would serve a valuable
purpose: “when entities hold themselves out as trustworthy, and
when they encourage the disclosure of personal information that
places end-users in a vulnerable position, entities should be held
accountable . . . .”239 Also, modern information fiduciaries “may be
held to reasonable ethical standards of trust and confidentiality”
because of the type of business they engage in.240
The Data Fiduciary Rule would also affect third parties. “Funda-
mentally, a higher legal obligation to users would help shift the
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default attitude of data collectors from ‘collect everything and ask
questions later,’ as would holding the service provider responsible
for enabling privacy invasions by third parties.”241 Both Balkin and
the proposed Data Care Act propose that “fiduciaries should be re-
quired to contractually obligate any third parties they share data
with to uphold the fiduciary duties they owe their users.”242 Invok-
ing a property concept, “fiduciary obligations must run with the
data.”243 “Affirmative legal duties to users, like a prohibition on
sharing their information except with entities required to uphold
the fiduciary’s same duties, would vastly limit incentives to share
information” in a reckless fashion.244
This model invokes common sense. An information fiduciary
model of privacy regulation bears logical resemblance to fiduciary
obligations already recognized in American law.245 For example,
consider a doctor, lawyer, or accountant that sold personal infor-
mation about their clients to a data broker.246 If these professionals
used personal information to manipulate their client’s actions for
self-interested ends or to gain a business advantage at the expense
of their client, they would likely face liability for violating their pro-
fessional conduct obligations.247 In essence, the information fiduci-
ary model of privacy regulation merely suggests we extend similar
fiduciary principles to those consumer entities which now possess
equally sensitive information as professional service providers.
Just as in their interactions with doctors, accountants, and lawyers,
many consumers assume a sense of personal trust or special confi-
dentiality in their online interactions. Information fiduciaries are
no longer just lawyers, doctors, and accountants. In the digital age,
they now include our bankers, ride-sharers, social media platforms,
digital communications services, and even schools.
“[A]n information fiduciary framework can strike the necessary
balance of competing objectives: it is designed to balance commer-
cial prerogatives with meaningful protections for individuals in the
way that U.S. privacy law attempts, yet fails, to do.”248 Applying
fiduciary duties to data collectors raises the bar of how digital com-
panies are expected to treat user information.249 “It would help
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adjust the objective of U.S. privacy law to more heavily prioritize
the rights of the user, while still accounting for the commercial pre-
rogatives of the collector.”250 “Duties of loyalty, care, and confiden-
tiality can also prohibit digital harms such as manipulation, dis-
crimination, and other harms that laws exclusively focused on pri-
vacy are ill-equipped to prevent, while still permitting non-harmful
commercial activity.”251
Fiduciary rules provide flexibility with respect to professional
prerogatives, but they are not “toothless, and they implicate a moral
dimension to the regulation of commercial conduct that other con-
sumer protection regulation does not automatically invoke . . . .”252
Exploiting user information “should not be required for digital prod-
ucts and services to function, and for most of them it is not.”253 So-
cial networks “need not be inherently manipulative, discriminatory,
or privacy-invasive—the same is true for an internet service pro-
vider, a rideshare company, a medical device company, or a cloud
service.”254 Applying fiduciary duties to data collectors requires dis-
tinguishing the “kinds of conduct that are inherent to the service—
such as a search engine ‘discriminating’ by sorting through infor-
mation and only providing the responsive results—from disloyal
conduct designed to benefit the data collector to the detriment of
the subject.”255
An information fiduciary framework also solves asymmetric in-
formation problems. As in the pre-2008 mortgage markets, modern
consumer markets that are reliant on mass data suffer from asym-
metric information problems—consumer entities simply possess in-
formation with respect to their data practices that consumers do
not. Fiduciary concepts may again provide a solution. Fiduciary
law assumes that fiduciaries and their beneficiaries are not on
“equal footing” because fiduciaries usually possess special skills or
knowledge that their beneficiaries lack.256 The beneficiaries depend
upon the fiduciaries to perform certain tasks for them and are often
ill-equipped to monitor the behavior of the fiduciaries or prevent
them from abusing their relationship of trust, absent any obliga-
tions that fiduciary law would supply.257 Because of information,
skill, and knowledge asymmetries, the beneficiaries must trust the
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fiduciaries to act in their best interest.258 “There are strong asym-
metries of information between companies and end users.”259 Com-
pany “operations, algorithms, and collection practices are mostly
kept secret,” most often for sound business reasons.260 Still, “end-
users are not in a very good position to assess how well companies
will protect their interests or to decide which company will treat
them best in the long run” because “end-users are largely depend-
ent on the good will of these companies not to abuse their personal
information.”261 Consequently, these businesses “present the famil-
iar problems that generally give rise to fiduciary obligations.”262 It
is difficult for consumers to verify company “representations about
data collection, security, use, and dissemination”263 or to compre-
hend what companies do with their data.264 Even if consumers un-
derstood these practices, it would be nearly impossible for consum-
ers to monitor them.265 This situation is analogous to that of finan-
cial advisors. Consumers expect that financial advisors will make
money from consumers seeking financial advice.266 However, the
fact that consumers expected financial advisors to make money did
not prevent the government from attempting to impose fiduciary
obligations upon them.267
3. Obstacles to Data’s Fiduciary Rule, Skepticism, and Sup-
plemental Regulation
Privacy regulations would not be immune to constitutional scru-
tiny.268 However, the type of regulation would matter, as privacy
regulations concerning the collection and use of data rather than
data analysis, disclosure, or sale are less likely to face First Amend-
ment challenges.269 But, even First Amendment arguments would
not doom privacy regulations targeted at data analysis, disclosure,
or sale, as when data is “collected, collated, used, and sold in bulk”
it is a commodity rather than speech.270 Specifically, the question
arises as to how legislators could keep the information fiduciary
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266. Id. at 1228.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1194.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1196.
Summer 2021 Too Big to Protect 357
concept from running afoul of the First Amendment and any right
to corporate speech. The answer rests in the law. As Balkin recog-
nized, “when the law prevents a fiduciary from disclosing or selling
information about a client—or using information to a client’s disad-
vantage—this does not violate the First Amendment, even though
the activity would be protected if there were no fiduciary relation-
ship.”271
Additional regulation is necessary to supplement any Data Fidu-
ciary Rule. A regulatory framework based exclusively on infor-
mation fiduciaries would not solve all the problems of “overreaching
that will inevitably occur in the age of Big Data.”272 Any consumer
privacy fiduciary rule cannot operate in a vacuum if it is to operate
successfully. A fiduciary approach is not a replacement for “badly
needed structural reforms.”273 Supplemental provisions would also
aim to “strengthen existing protections, such as more meaningful
obligations to enact reasonable security protocols, and stricter re-
quirements to notify users in the case of breach.”274 For example,
opt-in rules could be a helpful supplement to an information fiduci-
ary framework. Such rules can also likely withstand judicial scru-
tiny, as in 2009 the D.C. Circuit upheld new FCC rules imposing
opt-in requirements even in light of a First Amendment chal-
lenge.275
Also, compliance disasters in the early years of the rule could be
an issue. Thus, during a legislative phase-in period, to avoid sub-
jection to penalties under Data’s Fiduciary Rule, corporations could
be permitted to enter into “best interest contracts” with consumers
that affirm fiduciary status and incorporate a duty of loyalty, simi-
lar to the BICE the Department of Labor developed following the
2008 financial collapse.276 The framework proposed by this article
is not the only approach to enacting a data fiduciary rule in the con-
sumer privacy realm. For example, there is a more broad and flex-
ible approach that would likely be subject to extensive judicial in-
terpretation and administrative discretion. Ariel Dobkin argues
that “informational fiduciary duties should be divided into four cat-
egories of behavior: manipulation, discrimination, sharing with
271. Id. at 1210; see id. at 1211–20 (discussing the difference between speech which is in
the public discourse and speech which is removed therefrom and the implications for regula-
tion thereof).
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third parties without consent, and violations of a company’s privacy
policy.”277 “A duty is violated when the fiduciary exceeds a reason-
able user’s expectations, which those types of conduct will generally
do.”278
But, political conservatives and skeptics need not fear this regu-
latory framework as being a government overreach, as such a rule
would “not apply to everyone. Merely communicating with someone
over the Internet does not make [an entity] an information fiduci-
ary.”279 Thus, many business practices concerning consumer data
will remain free from regulation.280 Moreover, the duties legislators
may impose on these businesses are likely to be “considerably nar-
rower” than traditional professional fiduciary responsibilities.281
Also, imposition of fiduciary responsibilities does not mean that all
American consumer businesses will suddenly become non-profit en-
tities.282 The regulatory relationship need not be parasitic or eco-
nomically harmful; rather, it can be cooperative. “[E]ven though
virtual environments are privately owned, governments could cre-
ate framework statutes that would require platform owners to re-
spect the free speech and privacy rights of end users in return for
special legal status and benefits.”283 Ultimately, the legislative pro-
cess and administrative rulemaking procedures will fashion the
precise contours of data’s fiduciary rule. Yet, that is beyond the
scope of this article.
B. Creation of the Consumer Data Protection Bureau
In the wake of recent data breaches, some have called for the cre-
ation of a governmental data protection agency in the United
States.284 Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) suggested
that “immediate action” be taken to “address the broader problem
of . . . mishandling of consumers’ personal data.”285 Reforms should
aim to “put consumers back in control of both their credit reports
and their personal information.”286 Successful privacy legislation
must rely on an enforcement agency that would be given adequate
rulemaking authority, civil penalty authority, and sufficient
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resources and manpower.287 EPIC notes that with respect to con-
sumer-facing financial institutions, although Dodd-Frank trans-
ferred authority over certain privacy provisions to the CFPB, the
law did not transfer regulatory authority to establish data security
guidelines.288
However, the FTC, the federal government’s current privacy en-
forcement arm, is already cooperating with the CFPB.289 In Decem-
ber 2019, the FTC and CFPB hosted a public workshop to discuss
issues affecting the accuracy of traditional credit reports as well as
employment and tenant background screening reports. Conse-
quently, the United States should also establish a data protection
agency like “virtually every other advanced economy facing the
challenges of the digital age.”290 This action is necessary because
“[t]he current agencies in the United States tasked with protecting
consumers and citizens lack the authority and even the personnel
to do what needs to be done.”291
As to the specific structure and responsibilities of a data protec-
tion agency in the United States, one may look to the CFPB for
guidance. Accordingly, a Consumer Data Protection Bureau
(CDPB) would ideally function as follows. Congress should vest in
the CDPB the consumer privacy protection functions of agencies
like the FTC, giving the CDPB broad authority in three primary
areas—rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement. The CDPB
would operate as an independent bureau within the Department of
Commerce, not subject to the whim of Congressional appropria-
tions. It would be led by a single director appointed by the Presi-
dent and confirmed by the United States Senate. The CDPB would
need adequate manpower to be effective. This enforcement force
would likely need to be as large as the CFPB’s 1,500 employees,292
if not larger. The CDPB’s authority would be over “covered entities”
that, because of their relationship with a consumer, have taken on
special duties with respect to the sensitive information they obtain
in the course of this relationship.
With respect to rulemaking, the CDPB would have the power to
create rules to administer, enforce, and implement federal con-
sumer privacy protection law. Concerning its supervisory
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authority, the CDPB would have the power to ensure compliance
with the laws and regulations it administers by being able to re-
quire reports and examinations of entities to assess their compli-
ance and practices with respect to consumer privacy. To protect
start-ups and small businesses, the CDPB’s authority could be ju-
risdictionally-limited to only those entities which meet a certain
economic threshold, as Congress would define, focusing upon major
companies whose practices implicate consumer privacy—think
Google, Facebook, and Equifax. Lastly, an effective CDPB would
possess significant authority in the realm of enforcement tools: (1)
the power to conduct investigations; (2) the ability to bring public
legal actions in federal court or an administrative forum; and (3)
the ability to seek injunctive and monetary relief for violations of
consumer privacy law by covered entities. Obviously, the CDPB
would not be a panacea to all consumer privacy issues. However, it
would be a substantial start to bringing the law into alignment with
the realities of twenty-first century American life.
C. Data’s “Volcker Rule”
Comprehensive consumer privacy legislation in the United
States should also include its own version of the Volcker Rule to
safeguard consumer data against risky corporate practices. Just as
Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule limited the extent which banks could
make risky investments with its depositors’ money, a Data Volcker
Rule would limit the extent to which businesses could engage in
risky practices with consumer data.293 Third-party data sharing is
one possible practice to monitor. Furthermore, the concept of a
Data Volcker Rule is not entirely unprecedented. Consider the Eu-
ropean Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Un-
der the GDPR, institutions that share personal data with third-par-
ties either for storage or processing must ensure the third-party’s
compliance with the provisions of the GDPR.294 In the United
States, Apple CEO Tim Cook has called for government regulation
that would advance two goals: first, increasing the difficulty of data
collection by corporate entities; and, second, urging a crackdown on
data brokers who transfer consumer data between companies.295 In
sum, comprehensive consumer privacy legislation should guard
against “gambling” with consumers’ most sensitive information.
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CONCLUSION
Overall, American consumers face a privacy crisis in 2020. The
origins of the privacy crisis share numerous parallels to the finan-
cial collapse that crippled the American and global economies in
2008. Just as Congress responded to the 2008 financial collapse
with comprehensive financial services reform legislation in the form
of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress must respond to the 2020 con-
sumer privacy crisis with comprehensive privacy reform legislation.
Congress would be wise to mirror aspects of Dodd-Frank if privacy
reform efforts are to succeed, such as including fiduciary obliga-
tions, the creation of a new consumer protection agency, and ena-
bling the promulgation of rules designed to limit risky corporate
practices. No single piece of legislation will be able to entirely guard
against the privacy perils of twenty-first century life, just as no sin-
gle piece of legislation can entirely prevent economic collapse. Con-
sumers did not lose their privacy in a day; Congress cannot reclaim
it instantaneously. However, failing to address the privacy crisis
would be an even larger blunder than allowing it to develop in the
first place. A Dodd-Frank approach to consumer privacy legislation
is a worthy start.
